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Chief global economist | Managing director, Research & Insights | Deloitte Services LP
United States
Ira Kalish is the chief global economist of Deloitte Services LP. He is a specialist in global economic issues and the effects of economic, demographic, and social trends on the global business environment.
On the other hand, US-based producers of liquefied natural gas are reportedly planning to boost exports in response to supply shortages stemming from the disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the prices they can command are very favorable for them. It is reported that some US producers have some extra capacity, as well. However, to significantly boost output would require new investments that would take many years to bear fruit. In a recent meeting with several European economists, I was asked if the US government might impose export restrictions on LNG to avoid domestic price increases. As far as I know, this is not being considered. The Europeans were worried about losing access to American LNG, given the shortage of gas coming from Qatar.
It is also reported that some of the world’s airlines are concerned about potential shortages of jet fuel and are planning accordingly. For example, European airlines that fly to Asia can currently obtain fuel for the initial journey. However, they worry that shortages of Middle Eastern oil could make it difficult to obtain fuel for the journey back from Asia to Europe. Consequently, some airlines are considering limiting the number of flights in the coming weeks, already contending with a doubling of jet-fuel prices. For many airlines, this is an immediate hit to their profitability, given many don’t routinely engage in hedging strategies when purchasing fuel.
In recent years, jet-fuel refining has increased in the Middle East, with Kuwait accounting for 15% of seaborne jet fuel that must travel through the Strait of Hormuz. Refining capacity has declined in Europe but increased in China. Yet, China has ordered a halt to exports of refined fuel. Thus, fuel consumers are scrambling to secure alternate sources. If the conflict continues for a while, there could be a big increase in airline fares leading to a significant decline in demand.
To limit the risk of a sharp and sustained rise in oil prices, Birol said that households and businesses may need to adjust their behavior and, thereby, reduce demand for oil. For example, the International Energy Agency urged governments to encourage people to work from home, avoid air travel, and reduce driving speeds—similar to what happened in the 1970s. At that time, and in response to dramatic increases in oil prices, there was a significant shift toward less reliance on oil, toward driving more fuel-efficient cars, and to using less energy in the production process. Birol has compared the current crisis to what happened in the 1970s, noting that 40% of today’s nuclear power plants were built in response to the energy crisis of the 1970s.
Also, Birol noted that the disruption of the energy market is not simply about direct consumption of energy. Rather, several important commodities are byproducts of hydrocarbon production. Thus, a shortage of oil and gas leads to a shortage of key commodities that are important for fertilizers and other final products. The global impact of higher prices of such commodities could be significant.
Meanwhile, investor sentiment worsened further following two events in the Middle East last week. First, Iran’s South Pars gas field was attacked by Israel, thereby diminishing Iran’s capacity to produce natural gas. Then, the Ras Laffan Industrial City in Qatar—the world’s largest facility for LNG production—was repeatedly attacked by Iran. The price of Brent crude oil shot up to as high as US$116, while the price of European natural gas increased 30%. Investors appear increasingly focused on the risk of additional disruptions and the possibility that the conflict could prove to be prolonged.
As for the US Fed, the 12-member policy committee voted 11 to 1 to keep the benchmark interest rate unchanged. Chair Powell said that “higher energy prices will push up overall inflation, but it is too soon to know the scope and duration of the potential effects on the economy.” He also added that “the thing I really want to emphasize is that nobody knows. The economic effects could be bigger, they could be smaller, they could be much smaller or much bigger. We just don’t know.” As such, the Fed took a wait-and-see approach to monetary policy, which was expected.
Both voting and nonvoting members of the policy committee offered their forecasts for inflation, unemployment, gross domestic product growth, and future interest rates. They largely increased their expectations for inflation since the last meeting. Importantly, 12 of the 19 members predicted at least one interest rate cut this year while seven said there will be no cut. Thus, the members are somewhat divided but with a bias toward holding tight.
Meanwhile, the five-year breakeven rate, which measures bond investor expectations for average inflation over the next five years, has risen 26 basis points since the conflict began—hitting the highest level since February 2025 and the second highest since March 2023. In addition, the futures market is now showing a 60% implied probability that the Fed will leave the benchmark rate unchanged for the remainder of 2026. This is up from 47% a week ago and 5.3% one month ago. The implied probability of just one rate cut is now 31%. Thus, most investors seem even more pessimistic about monetary easing than the policymakers at the Fed.
Interestingly, no member of the Fed’s policy committee suggested that there will be an increase in the benchmark interest rate this year. And the futures market priced in only a 2.5% probability of a single rate increase. This makes the United States different from other major countries where investors are expecting a tightening of monetary policy in the face of accelerating inflation. Why the difference? One reason is that, in Europe and Asia, LNG prices have already increased dramatically while, in the United States, the price paid for natural gas has been relatively steady, despite some hikes. Given their massive use of LNG for electric power and heating, Europe and Asia could potentially see a much bigger boost to inflation than the United States where natural gas plays a big role in electricity production.
The ECB added that “inflation has been revised up compared with the December projections, especially for 2026. This is because energy prices will be higher owing to the war in the Middle East.” Although the ECB offered no guidance as to future monetary policy decisions, its statements suggest the possibility that interest rates could be increased this year—an expectation shared by some investors. However, a tightening of monetary policy, combined with the impact of higher energy prices on household purchasing power, would likely lead to a slowdown in economic growth.
The Bank of England (BOE), through a unanimous vote of the policy committee, kept the benchmark interest rate unchanged, commenting that “conflict in the Middle East has caused a significant increase in global energy and other commodity prices, which will affect households’ fuel and utility prices and have indirect effects via businesses’ costs. Prior to this, there had been continued disinflation in domestic prices and wages. CPI inflation will be higher in the near term as a result of the new shock to the economy.” The BOE added that it is “alert to the increased risk of domestic inflationary pressures through second-round effects in wage and price-setting, the risk of which will be greater the longer higher energy prices persist.” Thus, the previous bias toward easing of monetary policy appears to be diminished, for now.
Meanwhile, the yield on Germany’s 10-year bond increased to 3.04%—the highest level since 2011. The yield on France’s 10-year bond hit 3.75%—the highest since 2009. These dramatic increases reflect several things. First, investors anticipate a strong possibility of a big increase in eurozone inflation, especially given the sharp rise in European natural gas prices and Europe’s considerable usage of gas. Second, investors expect the ECB to potentially increase interest rates in response to rising inflation. Futures markets are pricing in two interest rate hikes by the ECB this year.
Also, the yield on the UK Treasury’s 10-year bond hit 5%—the highest since 2008. Investors now expect the BOE to engage in three rate hikes this year. Inflation was already a concern in the United Kingdom even before this conflict began. Moreover, the BOE had already signaled an intention to fight inflation.
The rise in bond yields in the United States and Europe, if sustained, could have a negative impact on housing markets and on business investment. The increase in yields not only reflects expectations about inflation but also reflects uncertainty about how long the conflict is expected to last and how significant the damage to infrastructure will be. Thus, yields have a significant risk premium that will only go away when the conflict ends, and the risk of further conflict recedes.
The Chinese government reported, that in the first two months of 2026, retail sales were up 2.8% from a year earlier—the best performance since October. The first two months included the Lunar New Year holiday, which saw strong spending in some categories. Spending on apparel was up 10.4% while spending on alcohol and tobacco was up 19.1%. On the other hand, spending on automobiles was down 7.3%.
Industrial production in China was up 6.3%—the strongest since September, while manufacturing output increased 6.6%. Output of computers and communication equipment was up 14.2%. Production of automobiles, however, was up only 3.4%.
Finally, fixed-asset investment in China was up 1.8% year over year in the first two months of 2026. This was the first bit of growth recorded since August last year. Investment was up 11.4% for infrastructure and up 3.1% for manufacturing. On the other hand, investment in property continued to decline, with a drop of 11.1% in the first two months of 2026. Excluding property, overall investment was up 5.2%.
The second shock was the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, which disrupted supply chains not only in energy but also in agriculture and manufacturing. This contributed to an acceleration of global inflation. The third shock was the historically high US tariffs in 2025. While there was an inflationary impact in the United States, it was muted, as companies were reluctant to fully pass on the costs of tariffs to their customers. The tariff shock also contributed to a significant shift in global trading patterns and will likely lead to a shift in supply chain design.
Finally, the conflict in the Middle East represents the fourth shock and, so far, is disrupting supply chains in oil, gas, fertilizer, and air cargo.
There are three lessons from the experience of the past half decade. First, globalization remains an important feature of the global economy and has shown little signs of disappearing. Thus, when shocks come, they tend to have an impact across the global economy. Second, the global system has demonstrated areas of fragility. Shocks in one region can create disruptions on the other side of the world. Third, the global system has shown considerable resilience. Despite the first three shocks, the world managed to avoid a global recession, continued to grow, and only saw a temporary surge in inflation. The free-market system, combined with rapid response by monetary and fiscal authorities, helped to limit more severe economic outcomes. Moreover, many companies quickly diversified their supply chains, in some cases with encouragement and support from governments. Ultimately, such diversification helps reduce the risk of disruption from future shocks.
The economic impact of these significant increases in commodity prices will depend in large part on how long the Strait remains closed. The resulting economic consequences are not directly due to the military activity in the region. Rather, they reflect a broader pattern of escalation and retaliation that has affected production, transportation, and logistics across the region. Disruptions to shipping through the Strait have constrained maritime transit, while interruptions to oil and gas output have affected production and distribution infrastructure. In addition, disruptions to regional airports have affected both passenger and air cargo traffic.
Meanwhile, it has been reported that Iranian tankers are continuing to pass through the Strait, indicating that Iran may have the capacity to keep the Strait largely closed to others for an extended period. Theoretically, Iran could choose to keep the Strait closed until a mutually agreeable ceasefire is reached. If that happens, the economic consequences of this conflict could be significant.
Meanwhile, the United States carried out strikes on the military facilities on Kharg Island, which is the main transit point for Iranian oil, while refraining for targeting the oil distribution facilities. President Trump said that he will consider doing so if Iran continues to block the Strait of Hormuz. Attacking such facilities would undermine Iran’s ability to generate oil revenue. On the other hand, such an action would reduce the global oil supply and might increase the risk of retaliatory strikes on other Gulf nations.
Meanwhile, the economic consequences of the conflict extend beyond energy, although energy remains extremely important. The price of sulfur, a byproduct of oil and gas refining, has soared. A good deal of sulfur is produced in the Gulf region and is shipped to the rest of the world through the Strait of Hormuz. Sulfur is used to produce fertilizer and is also used in chemicals, semiconductors, and metal processing, including copper production. As a result, the surge in the price of sulfur could have significant consequences in numerous industries, thereby fueling global inflation.
Another chemical that could soon be in short supply is helium. About one-third of global helium production takes place in Qatar and shipments are currently halted. About one-fifth of helium is consumed by the semiconductor industry, which uses helium to cool semiconductors during the fabrication process. A shortage of helium could lead to higher prices for chips.
The disruption in the Gulf, if sustained, will likely lead to an acceleration in inflation in multiple countries, potentially leading to a shift in monetary policies. In the United States, the five-year breakeven rate, which measures bond investor expectations of average inflation over the next five years, has risen by 20 basis points since the conflict in the Middle East began. One result is a shift in expectations regarding the Federal Reserve policy. In the United States, the futures market’s implied probability that the Fed will not change the benchmark interest rate when it meets soon is now 99.1%. This is up from 90.8% nearly one month ago. This shift, in part, reflects the view that there will be an acceleration in inflation due to the Middle East conflict and that, consequently, the Fed maybe be averse to rocking the boat.
What about longer-term expectations for Fed policy? The futures market now sees a 41.5% probability of no rate cut and a 39.9% likelihood that there will only be one interest rate cut before the end of this year. This has risen from a 3.4% probability of no rate cut and a 16% probability of one rate cut, nearly one month ago. This is a significant shift in expectations in just one month and appears to be closely tied to the Middle East conflict. This also suggests that investors are revising their assumptions about the policy stance of the incoming Fed Chair, Kevin Warsh, including expectations regarding the pace and extent of monetary easing previously anticipated. In other major countries, expectations regarding future monetary policy have also shifted.
Investors appear to be assigning a meaningful probability to the possibility that the war could last longer than a few weeks and, consequently, have a sustained impact. Meanwhile, an index of equities on the Saudi market, which initially declined sharply when the conflict began, is now above its pre-conflict level. Thus, investors in Saudi Arabia, despite the country’s exposure to a prolonged conflict, seem to be confident that it necessarily may not last very long.
What happens if the conflict continues for a while? A prolonged disruption to transit through the Strait of Hormuz—the most consequential economic impact of the war—would likely mean sustained high energy prices, perhaps higher than now. That could potentially add to global inflation, weaken purchasing power, and prompt tighter monetary policies. In addition, continued constraints to shipments of Middle Eastern fertilizer to the rest of the world could diminish the crop yields this season, potentially leading to a big increase in the global price of food about six months from now. In developing countries, this could exacerbate the existing economic and food security challenges. In more affluent countries, it could increase financial stress for lower-income households, with potentially significant political implications. Finally, ongoing disruptions to Middle Eastern air cargo corridors will likely disrupt global supply chains in high-end manufacturing.
What will be the impact by country or region? There is much talk about how the United States, as it is now a net exporter of oil and gas, may be less adversely impacted than other countries. While that is broadly the case, US consumers would still likely face higher energy costs, even as the US energy sector may benefit from higher prices. For net exporters of oil and gas, this crisis could mean a shift in resources to other countries. Either way, households would likely see some loss of purchasing power. For countries that import most of their oil and gas and are large manufacturers, such as China and Japan, this crisis could translate to a significant increase in the cost of producing exportable goods.
We don’t know how long this conflict will last. If it lasts longer than expected, or if the damage to energy infrastructure is substantial, the economic impact could be significant. A sustained rise in energy and food prices could exacerbate global inflation, potentially influencing monetary policy in many countries. It could also reduce the purchasing power of consumers, potentially leading to an economic slowdown.
What follows are some observations and potential impacts:
The US administration initially suggested that the war would likely last four to five weeks but has since indicated it could be longer and has not dismissed the idea of putting troops on the ground in Iran. Thus, there is uncertainty about the potential duration and scale of the war. Recent activities involving Iran’s neighboring countries highlight the risk of escalation potentially leading to a wider and more disruptive conflict.
In any global crisis, uncertainty typically leads investors to seek assets that are perceived as safe. Historically, in modern times, the perceived safest asset was US Treasury bonds. Notably, the conflict in the Middle East led to a rise in the value of the US dollar and a rise in US bond yields. This combination is not what you might have expected. If the rise in the dollar had been due to the perception of the dollar as a safe asset, then it would be expected that investors would have purchased US Treasury bonds and yields would have fallen. The rise in yields on US Treasury bonds implies that Treasuries are no longer seen as the safest asset. Instead, this role has been assumed by gold, which has risen sharply. But how, then, can we explain the rise in the value of the US dollar?
One reason lies in the role played by oil. Oil is mostly traded in US dollars, and its price has risen sharply recently. Hence, the demand for US dollars has risen, thereby boosting the value of the dollar. If the conflict ends quickly and the price of oil reverts to a lower level, some of the upward pressure on the US dollar could diminish commensurately.
Also, the rise in the price of oil has affected expectations for inflation and, consequently, expectations for Federal Reserve policy. If investors now expect the Fed to keep rates higher than otherwise, as is indicated in the futures market, that implies higher returns and, consequently, stronger demand for dollars. Again, this discussion could become moot once the conflict ends.
Meanwhile, the Japanese yen has weakened, indicating that, like US Treasury bonds, it is not seen as a safe-haven asset during this crisis. Japan imports all of its oil, with 90% coming from the Middle East. Higher prices mean slower economic growth. Still, the deputy governor of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) said that the central bank won’t shift the trajectory of monetary policy in response to the Middle East conflict. In the past year, policy has been gradually tightened to fight higher than desired inflation. Considering the situation in Middle East, Japan could face even higher inflation.
Likewise, investors have revised their expectations for interest rate policy on the part of the ECB and the Bank of England (BOE).
With the Strait of Hormuz essentially shut down, producers of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) that depend on the Strait are facing growing logistical constraints including limited storage space. Consequently, they are cutting production. It is reported that between 7 and 11 million barrels of oil per day are now missing from the market. Investor response has been to push up the price of crude. Brent crude hit US$90 per barrel today, the highest in two years. Recall that, as recently as February 25, the price was US$70 per barrel.
There is concern that the problem could become far worse. The Energy Minister of Qatar said that the crisis could “bring down the economies of the world.” He said that, within days, all energy exports from the Gulf could shut down, potentially causing the price of oil to rise to US$150 per barrel. He also said that Iran’s attack on Qatar’s largest LNG plant means that, even if the conflict ends quickly, it could take “weeks to months” to return to a normal level of production.
Meanwhile, the cutoff of Qatari gas could be hugely impactful in Europe. Although Qatari LNG only accounts for about 7% of the LNG consumed in Europe, the cutoff is important because, currently, gas stocks are unusually low. In Germany, for example, gas inventories are running at only 27% of capacity, much lower than the 64% that is typical at this time of year. Thus, the loss of Qatari LNG has boosted the price of gas in Europe by more than 70% in recent times.
And, if Europe cannot get LNG from Qatar, where might it find available gas? One answer is Russia, from whom Europe continues to purchase Russian gas, although far less than before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But this crisis could lead Europe to purchase more from Russia, thereby enhancing Russian revenue and its ability to wage war in Ukraine. On the other hand, Russian President Putin said that Russia might decide to stop selling gas to Europe. Specifically, Putin said that “other markets are opening up. And perhaps it would be more profitable for us to stop supplying the European market right now.” In any event, the Middle East conflict puts Russia and other gas producers in a favorable position.
Meanwhile, the impact of this conflict is also being felt in East Asia, especially Japan and South Korea, which are almost entirely dependent on imported energy, much of which comes from the Middle East. With the Strait of Hormuz essentially shut down, the volume of oil and gas that can be delivered from the Middle East has declined. As such, Asian countries are currently seeking alternative sources. Of particular interest will be gas from the United States and Australia. In China, the government has ordered some refineries to stop exporting refined products.
Urea is produced from synthetic ammonia and carbon-dioxide. The latter is produced during ammonia production as a byproduct of burning hydrocarbons. Hence, most urea plants are adjacent to plants where ammonia is produced, usually where hydrocarbons are in abundant supply. This explains why so much urea production takes place in the Gulf region.
The biggest Gulf exporters of urea are Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Their exports go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is currently inactive. In the case of Qatar, the destruction of an LNG plant is affecting urea production not only in Qatar but elsewhere. Indian production of fertilizer is shutting down due to the lack of access to Qatar LNG. Pakistani production is also being hampered.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, there was also a big increase in the price of fertilizer due to the initial disruption from that war. This will be similar, possibly worse depending on how long the conflict continues. It is a demonstration that, despite all the headwinds, globalization continues to endure. Plus, the global economy remains highly vulnerable to events that disrupt transportation.
In addition, civil aviation, both for passengers and air cargo, has been disrupted. Air space is shut down in Israel and Qatar and is only partially open in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Given the role the region plays as an air hub for travel between Europe and Asia, the cancellation of 18,000 flights has been hugely disruptive to tourism and business travel.
Perhaps of even greater importance is the impact on the US$8 trillion air cargo market, which accounts for one-third of world trade in goods by value. It is the higher-valued goods that travel by air. This includes semiconductors, mobile phones, pharma products, and others. Notably, more than 12% of global air cargo passes through the Middle East. And it is reported that, since the conflict began, global air cargo capacity has declined by 18% because of the disruption to transportation in the Middle East. Capacity in the Middle East has fallen by 40%. The net impact of this will depend on how long the conflict lasts.
Although the share of the Middle-Eastern oil has declined from the global oil output, it remains substantial and is important to the global economy. What has changed significantly, however, is the amount of oil used per dollar of GDP. Consider the US economy, for example. Since 1980, US real GDP has increased by more than 300%. Yet during that period, the amount of oil consumed has barely budged. In other words, the United States is far less dependent on oil than in the past (and the same is true of most other major economies). As such, a shock to the oil market now has a far smaller impact on the economy than in 1980. Recall that, in 1979, the Iranian Revolution and the consequent huge increase in oil prices led to a sharp reduction in economic activity.
Why does the world use so much less oil per dollar of economic activity than in the past? There are several reasons. First, automobiles are far more fuel-efficient than previously, and many are now electric. Second, the world obtains more energy from non-oil sources than in the past, especially clean sources. Finally, the high prices of the late 1970s led businesses, governments, and homeowners to invest in improving efficiency. Office buildings, factories, warehouses, trains, airplanes, and homes use less energy than previously because of that investment.
If there is a sustained increase in the price of oil, it would influence various countries in different ways. For the United States, which is now a net exporter of oil, the impact would be far less onerous than in the past when it was a big net importer. Net importers such as China, Japan, and much of Europe would see a net increase in outflows of resources, thereby having a bigger negative impact on economic activity. In the case of China, it is reported that it has been storing large amounts of oil. If the price rises sharply, China could cut back on purchases and, instead, use stored oil for consumption.
In addition, a sustained higher price could cause an acceleration in global inflation, especially if central banks fail to tighten monetary policy. Recall that, in the 1970s, countries whose central banks accommodated the increase in oil prices saw a big increase in inflation. One exception was Germany where the Bundesbank tightened monetary policy and inflation increased more modestly. In the longer term, this had a positive impact on German economic activity relative to other countries.
The latest establishment survey found that, in February, the number of jobs fell by 92,000 from the previous month. The decline was across multiple industries. For example, employment fell 11,000 in construction, 12,000 in manufacturing, 11,300 in transportation and warehousing, 11,000 in information, 5,000 in professional and business services, 28,000 in health care, 27,000 in leisure and hospitality, and 6,000 in government. The decline in health care employment was particularly notable as this sector has typically been a consistent source of job growth in recent years. In fact, the strong reported job growth in January was largely due to increased employment in health care.
The establishment survey also provides data on wages. In February, average hourly earnings of private sector workers rose by 3.8% from a year earlier. This suggests wages continue to rise faster than inflation, thereby providing workers with added purchasing power.
The separate survey of households, which also includes data on self-employment, found that labor force growth was extremely modest in February, slower than the growth of the working-age population. This resulted in a decline in the rate of labor force participation. Meanwhile, employment fell sharply. The result was that the unemployment rate increased from 4.3% in January to 4.4% in February.
What accounts for the weakness of the US labor market? First, slower growth in the labor force, potentially related to tighter immigration policies, has limited the scope for strong employment gains even as the unemployment rate remains relatively low. Second, the past year of tariffs and tariff uncertainty has likely had a chilling effect on hiring. Uncertainty about the future of trade rules probably led companies to reduce hiring. In addition, some companies may have sought to avoid passing on the cost of tariffs to their customers. As such, they endeavored to cut costs, including labor costs, to avoid taking a hit to their profit margins.
Investor reaction to the latest report is hard to gauge given that investors are more focused on the impact of the conflict in the Middle East. However, the jobs report could have an impact on the calculus of the Fed, all other things being equal. A weak employment report likely boosts the probability of future rate cuts. On the other hand, the potential inflationary effects of the current crisis will likely be front and center for the Fed.
Chief global economist | Managing director, Research & Insights | Deloitte Services LP
United States
Ira Kalish is the chief global economist of Deloitte Services LP. He is a specialist in global economic issues and the effects of economic, demographic, and social trends on the global business environment.
Editorial: Rupesh Bhat, Arpan Saha, and Aparna Prusty
Audience development: Kelly Cherry
Cover image by: Sofia Sergi
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